Madness In Motion
Philosophy of mind, madness, and why psychiatry misdescribes human life
- Indexed issues, last 90 days
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- Sep 16, 2026
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- Jul 31, 2026
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Reason-responsiveness is a garbage construct (opens the original)
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Psychiatry’s conflation of Lockean versus Aristotelian essences (opens the original)
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A decade ago, my main interest with philosophy of psychiatry was the ever-controversial topic of classification and nosology. For it is here that legal and medical outcomes are ultimately determined “downstream” by governments and institutions across the world, so it is not entirely inconsequential. It is the realm of competing taxonomies such as the DSM, ICD, HiTOP, Fast-Slow-Defense model, and the (lesser known) PDM; along with their respective special interest groups (shills). But of course,
“Mechanisms” from inanimate sciences do not belong in psychiatry (opens the original)
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Biology psychiatry emphasizes the functions of biological systems, such as human beings, and their subsystems, such as endocrine systems, nervous systems, lympathic systems, circulatory systems, and so on (Kendler, Parnas, & Zachar, 2020). Oddly, when followers of biopsychiatry speak of mental disorders, including authors above, none of them describe these as macroscopic systems. For example, there is not a single mention of the words “hormones”, “respiratory”, “lymph
Staying bounded: autistic sensory disintegration and the perils of non-dualist states (opens the original)
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Can hylomorphism minimize psychiatry’s reification problem? (opens the original)
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The 17th century variety of substance metaphysics continues to influence Western psychiatry (Matthews, 2007, p. 54-70). If we reject dualism, it is the claim that for something to exist (ontically), its most fundamental unit are indivisible substances that produce and bear properties that are distinct from each other and the bearer (substance). That is, the substance “underlies” the distinctive properties of the entity in question. It is closely related to (but not the same as) <a href="https://
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