HeyJaredMacro-Financial Analysis and Banking (M-FAB)
Jill Cetina, CFA's Substack on all things macro-finance, banking, regulation, fixed income markets and financial stability
- Indexed issues, last 90 days
- 18
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- Sep 30, 2026
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- Aug 21, 2026
Latest issues
Sharing a few thoughts on today’s “lower” core PCE (opens the original)
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The Treasury market now appears to have reacted to "lower PCE" by bear steepening. As I was getting ready to teach this morning, the sell-off was most pronounced in long-dated TIPS and seems to have spread from there. <img alt="" class="sizing-normal" h
Sept Treasury Talk column (opens the original)
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Rising yields suggest a fiscal policy fork in the road coming between elevated inflation with stagflation risk or recession – exposing familiar cracks in US bank supervisionIn my last few Treasury Talk columns, I sketched out a set of cycle-end risks, pointing to a Fed late to tightening (growing divergence from a Taylor Rule), a stretched AI narrative, and expanding geopolitical challenges adding to H4L commodity prices, inflation, rising long-term interest rates globally and what that means fo
The Sell-off in Global Bonds and the Ghost of the 2023 US Bank Failures (opens the original)
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I am grateful to the Financial Times this week for sharing some of my reflections on the US banking landscape with a broader audience.A summary of my forthcoming BTRM Sept Treasury Talk column out early next week which will have charts and tables (AI assistance with the pithy summary): The sharp sell-off in long-dated global bonds reflects persistent inflation pressures and geopolitically driven supply shocks rather than
The 365 pg Starling report misses the multi-decade absence of US supervisory quantitative bright lines for interest rate and liquidity risk and the negative influence of monetary policy on S&R (opens the original)
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In DC the renewed discussion of SVB’s failure in the Starling report will assuredly be viewed as largely political theater.Nonetheless, I am choosing to take it as an opportunity once again to try to refocus the US public policy discussion on what went wrong with the supervision of a number of US banks in the spring of 2023 even as we appear set to enter further risks of elevated inflation, interest rate and liquidity turbulence in 2026/2027. I hope this post helps and therefore it is public - n
“So What Exactly Has Changed In Fed Supervision Since SVB’s Failure in 2023?” (opens the original)
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In an arguably tone deaf moment, we ended last week with Federal Reserve Vice Chair of Supervision Bowman (really, bringing up SVB as the 10-year Treasury yield closes above 5%?) reminding the world to ask the question-- 3 ½ years after the dramatic failures of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), First Republic and Signature, are US bank regulators any better prepared to supervise interest rate and liquidity shocks? Judging by both her speech and the Fed commercial bank supervision manual, the answer see
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